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If I we re to compres s Dewey into a s ingle s e n t e n c e it would be as fo l lows : "Live 
like an a r t o b j e c t s t r iv ing to become a work of a r t . " In unpacking his e s s e n c e I would 
have to l o c a t e , i d e n t i f y , and explain t h e e x i s t e n c e , t h e f u n c t i o n s , t he i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , 
and the meanings of e v e n t s and o b j e c t s ; t h e i n s t rumen ta l and the consummato ry ; 
evo lu t ion , e x p e r i e n c e , and communica t i on ; communi ty and d e m o c r a c y ; t he h i s to r i ca l 
n e c e s s i t i e s , no longer val id , of var ious dual isms; t h e r e l a t ion of t heo ry to p r a c t i c e ; t he 
c e n t r a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n to our human be ing . 
Richard B e r n s t e i n ' s John Dewey Socie ty L e c t u r e , "The Var ie t i e s of P lura l i sm" 
under t he same s e v e r e compress ion would emerge as "Keep the F a i t h . Phrones i s 
r ea l i zed is d e m o c r a t i c p lura l i sm. Act so as to c o n n e c t . " Unpacking Dewey is eas i e r than 
unpacking B e r n s t e i n . All of Dewey is p r e s e n t , b e f o r e us, as it w e r e . But t he Berns te in 
l e c t u r e is the Berns te in l e c t u r e — a p iece of wri t ing given s t r e n g t h and also pa r t i a l l y 
undone by t h e cond i t ions of i ts f inal c a u s e . It is wri t ing of a c e r t a i n l eng th , 
c o n s t r u c t e d to be p r e s e n t e d as a public e v e n t , in tended to in fo rm, to i n s t r u c t , to 
c a u t i o n and adv i se , and to g ive s t r eng th to any f lagging spi r i t s among us. And this it 
did, and does , d e m o n s t r a t i n g env iab le knowledge and m a s t e r f u l c o n t r o l of t he h is tory of 
p ragmat i sm and the r ise and fa l l of the hegemony of ana ly t i c phi losophy, p r e sen t ing 
va luab le ins ights r e s p e c t i n g t h e deve lopment of "wild p lura l i sm," and o f f e r i n g a t imely 
reminder of how me taphys i c s i n fo rms social t hough t . . . and much more . 
But I find myself torn by "Var ie t i e s of P lura l i sm," both a t t r a c t e d and d i s tu rbed by 
i t . I want someth ing more , someth ing more specu la t ive ly audac ious (see again Dewey ' s 
cal l for s p e c u l a t i v e a u d a c i t y with which Berns te in conc ludes his l e c t u r e , p. 18) than 
phrones i s , yet I am not sure t h e r e is someth ing more . Within t h e limits imposed by the 
l e c t u r e t h e r e is n o t . I also f ind the l e c t u r e fac ing a l a rge , i ronic problem, one of 
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Berns t e in ' s own making. Although it is public e v e n t , the l e c t u r e is not July Four th 
o r a t o r y ; it is learned d i scour se . It ex i s t s within a c o n t e x t cons is t ing in par t of John 
Dewey, P rax i s and Ac t ion , The R e s t r u c t u r i n g of Social and Pol i t ica l Theory , and 
Beyond Objec t iv i sm and Re la t iv i sm. I find it impossible to read "Var ie t i e s" wi thout 
playing it off aga ins t t h e s e o the r Berns te in works in which he has sub jec t ed Dewey and 
more r e c e n t l y the Big f o u r — A r e n d t , Gadamer , Habermas, and Ror ty—to ser ious 
c r i t i c i sm while still f inding in them insights in to " the problems of men" wi thout which 
we would be a t g r e a t loss . My read ing , then , c r e a t e s and e x a c e r b a t e s a l r eady exis t ing 
tens ions in "Var i e t i e s" and a c c o u n t s in par t for my d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t . 
Berns te in in less insp i ra t iona l t o n e , in more c r i t i ca l vo ice , hovers over his John 
Dewey L e c t u r e . The kind of ques t ions Berns te in has put to o t h e r s , to obta in c o n c r e t e 
social and pol i t ica l knowledge , must u l t imate ly be put to Berns te in . O the rwi se we shall 
remain at a dange rous level of a b s t r a c t i o n — c o n f r o n t e d and appealed to by a vision of 
d e m o c r a t i c plural ism (one impossible to deny) t ha t is to func t ion in a soc ie ty we 
r e c o g n i z e through the f ami l i a r i t y of a commonsense unders tand ing , which by i ts n a t u r e 
lacks dep th and c r i t i c a l i n s igh t . Be rns t e in ' s Deweyan roots and his own published work 
tell us t h a t vision joined to commonsense unders tand ing is not enough. 
Like all wr i t ing , Be rns t e in ' s l e c t u r e speaks to us and the world by c r e a t i n g a 
un iverse of meaning and d i scourse which beckons us to e n t e r . What is the world of 
Be rns t e in ' s "The Var ie t i e s of P lura l i sm"? 
It is severa l wor lds . It is a world of messaged hope grounded in the h is tory of 
philosophy and the n a t u r e of p rax is . It is a world in which t h e r e is a second c h a n c e 
which will not become f a r c e b e c a u s e the f i r s t c h a n c e has yet to become exhaus ted—or 
r e a l i z e d . We still possess the g i f t t ha t is Dewey and the bes t of the p r a g m a t i c 
under s t and ing of phrones i s and d e m o c r a t i c p lura l i sm. We a re in posi t ion to r e inven t and 
use them, now aided by t h e work of c u r r e n t a d v o c a t e s and r e inven to r s of phrones is , be 
their t e r r a i n onto logica l i nves t iga t ion or soc io -h i s to r i ca l c r i t i q u e . In Be rns t e in ' s 
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un ive r se , c u r r e n t h is tory and the d i a l ec t i c a l r e l a t i on of the n a t u r e and ac tua l e x i s t e n c e 
of the world , t he n a t u r e and p re sen t s t a t e of knowledge , and the n a t u r e of p r e s e n t 
r e a l i z a t i on of our human n a t u r e , combine to demand the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and commi tmen t 
to phrones i s and the soc ie ty it can p roduce b e c a u s e we a r e c r e a t u r e s of t e los in a 
soc ie ty tha t den ies us our t ru ly rea l ized be ing . And our t r u e being must ou t . C u r r e n t 
h is tory is pas t and p re sen t possibi l i ty s t ruggl ing with a co l l ec t i on of horror t a l e s . 
B e r n s t e i n ' s l e c t u r e d world is a world of f a i t h , wisdom, and n e c e s s i t y . Fa i th is a 
Deweyan like vision of c o m m u n i t y . It is "a t y p e of soc ie ty in which we can at once 
r e s p e c t and even c e l e b r a t e d i f f e r e n c e s and p lura l i ty but a lways s t r i ve to unde r s t and 
and seek a common ground with what is o ther and d i f f e r e n t . " (p. 15) It is a soc ie ty in 
which we ought to (and t h e r e f o r e can? ) " c u l t i v a t e phrones is and r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
to learn to l i s t en , speak , and ac t with o t h e r s in mutual unde r s t and ing , a mutual 
unde r s t and ing ( t h a t ) can r e c o g n i z e and honor genuine d i f f e r e n c e . " (p. 17) Not ment ioned 
he re is t he a p p r o p r i a t e t r e a t m e n t for genu ine d i f f e r e n c e s — a s p rac t i ces—which under no 
sense of t h e imag ina t ion d e s e r v e r e s p e c t . 
Phrones i s is t h e p a t h , t h e way. Phrones is t ru ly and fully r ea l i zed is d e m o c r a t i c 
p lura l i sm, but it is more . It is a form of wisdom. Phrones is is human in t e l l i gence in i ts 
bes t p r a c t i c a l r e sponse to the n a t u r e of human soc ie ty to s i t ua t i ons t ha t demand we 
a c t . It is born of n e c e s s i t y , t h e necess i ty of seeking in knowledge only the prec is ion 
p e r m i t t e d us by the n a t u r e of t h e s i tua t ions tha t demand we a c t , t h e s i t ua t i ons t h a t 
a r e both o b j e c t s and means of our inquiry and a c t i o n , t he s i t ua t i ons about which t h e r e 
a r e p ropos i t ions of the form: "M. N. should do this and so; it is b e t t e r , wiser , more 
p r u d e n t , r i gh t , adv i sab le , o p p o r t u n e , e x p e d i e n t , e t c . , to a c t thus and so.. . ."* 
B e r n s t e i n ' s un ive r se of d i scourse is also a pol i t ica l c a u t i o n a r y t a le in t ended for 
the l e f t . The r ight in i ts most r e a c t i o n a r y and e x t r e m e fo rmula t i ons and social 
f o r m a t i o n s is wi thou t doubt a b h o r r e n t to Be rns t e in . He does not address i t . Pe rhaps 
b e c a u s e it c a n n o t be w a r n e d . Pa radox ica l l y , some of i ts a d h e r e n t s can be saved f rom 
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themse lves only by the success of their a d v e r s a r i e s . The c e n t e r in par t d e f i n e s i tself 
by seeking to mainta in or r e s u s c i t a t e what it unde r s t ands to be the bes t of our 
t roubled s i t u a t i o n s . It ne i the r knows nor comprehends emanc ipa t ion or t o t a l i t y . It is not 
the a u d i e n c e for a c a u t i o n a r y t a l e . The l e f t under s t ands t ha t for the bes t of t he 
Deweyan vision to become a c t u a l i t y , a radical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of social , po l i t i ca l , and 
economic in s t i t u t i ons is e n t a i l e d . A new pol i t ica l geography and its proper sub j ec t s 
must be c r e a t e d . B e r n s t e i n ' s un iverse of d i scourse is the cal l for and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of an 
e m a n c i p a t o r y phrones is , t hose ac t i ons which help us to r e a l i z e and c h a n g e our human 
n a t u r e . It is also t h e a s se r t i on t h a t t h e r e is no a l t e r n a t i v e . And to r e p e a t , it is a 
c a u t i o n a r y t a l e , reminding us of what resu l t s f rom uti l izing t echn ica l reason where it 
does not belong—in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new polls—or from fol lowing t o t a l i t i e s , even 
those c o n s t r u c t e d in the i n t e r e s t s of emanc ipa t i on , in a world in which t h e r e "is no 
single t o t a l i t y in which eve ry th ing can be encompassed . " They turn into t e r ro r and 
v io lence . 
B e r n s t e i n ' s l e c t u r e d un iverse f inds and p laces us in an ex t remely t ry ing and 
d i f f i cu l t s i t u a t i o n . I want to ask of t he l e c t u r e one basic ques t ion which in formed my 
reading of it and helped shape my conc lus ions . The ques t ion is simply th is : What 
happens to the c o n t e n t of "The Var ie t i es of Plural ism" when it is c o n f r o n t e d by 
Berns te in himself hard at work e l s e w h e r e ? 
In Beyond Objec t iv i sm and Rela t iv i sm Berns te in sub jec t s Gadamer to tel l ing 
cr i t ic i sm abou t t h e meaning he gives to the te rm under s t and ing . He also puts some very 
hard ques t ions to him about t he n a t u r e and dynamics of our s o c i e t y . I shall quo te 
Berns te in at some length b e c a u s e what he says can and should be d i r e c t e d to "The 
Var ie t ies of P lura l i sm." Berns te in says of G a d a m e r : 
G a d a m e r ' s phi losophic h e r m e n e u t i c s does not include a de ta i l ed 
unde r s t and ing of how power as dominat ion (Her r scha f t )—the type 
of dominat ion tha t d e f o r m s p rax i s—opera t e s in the modern 
wor ld . . . , t he point we need to be a w a r e of is th i s : the danger for 
c o n t e m p o r a r y prax is is not t e c h n e , but domina t ion . . . ,no i n t e l l e c tua l 
o r i e n t a t i o n tha t seeks to i l luminate c o n c r e t e praxis in t h e 
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c o n t e m p o r a r y world c a n be judged a d e q u a t e if it f a i l s to c o n f r o n t 
ques t ions c o n c e a l i n g the c h a r a c t e r , dynamics , and t a c t i c s of power 
and domina t ion . 
G a d a m e r , acco rd ing to B e r n s t e i n , 
a c u t e l y ana lyzes the d e f o r m a t i o n of p rax i s in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y 
world , and yet on t h e o ther hand he seems to sugges t , r ega rd l e s s 
of the t ype of communi ty in which we l ive, t h a t phrones i s is 
a lways a real possibi l i ty . . . , (H)e s tops shor t of f ac ing t h e issues of 
what is to be done when the polls or communi ty i tself is 
' c o r r u p t ' - - w h e n t h e r e is a b reakdown of i ts nomoi and of ra t iona l 
d i scour se abou t t h e norms t h a t ought to govern our p r a c t i c a l 
l ives . . . .He te l l s us t ha t the c o n t e m p o r a r y unders t and ing of 
p r a c t i c a l r ea son as ' t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l ' has deg raded the c o n c e p t of 
p rax is . But if th is is t rue—and I c e r t a i n l y a g r e e t h a t it is—then 
one wan t s to know what is it abou t modern soc i e t i e s t h a t has 
c a u s e d this to happen . . . . Without some sort of t h e o r e t i c a l 
unde r s t and ing and exp lana t ion of t h e s t r u c t u r e and dynamics of 
modern t e chno log i ca l soc i e ty , t h e r e is a lways the real danger t ha t 
p rax i s will be i n e f f e c t u a l , merely a b s t r a c t . Let us not f o r g e t t h a t 
p rax i s r equ i r e s c h o i c e , de l i be r a t i on , and decis ion abou t what is to 
be done in c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n s . Informed ac t i on r equ i res us to t ry 
to u n d e r s t a n d and explain t h e sa l ient c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t he 
s i t u a t i o n s we c o n f r o n t . 
The i m p o r t a n c e of G a d a m e r ' s ana ly t i c shor tcomings is under l ined as we read 
B e r n s t e i n ' s de sc r ip t i on of our c h a o t i c and con fus ing t imes , t he t imes t ha t p roduce wild 
plura l isms and f a l s e and mis leading t o t a l i t i e s . Berns te in says : 
A communi ty or a polis is not something t h a t can be made or 
e n g i n e e r e d by some form of t e c h n e or by the admin i s t r a t i on of 
s o c i e t y . . . T h e coming in to being of a type of public l i fe t h a t can 
s t r e n g t h e n so l ida r i t y , public f r e e d o m , a wil l ingness to ta lk and to 
l i s t en , mutual d e b a t e , and a commi tment to r a t iona l persuas ion 
p resupposes t h e inc ip ien t forms of such communal l i f e . [However , 
we l i v e ] in a s i t u a t i o n in which t h e r e is a b reakdown of such 
communi t i e s , and w h e r e the very cond i t ions of social l i fe have the 
c o n s e q u e n c e s of f u r t h e r i n g such a b reakdown. . . . in addi t ion to the 
a t t e m p t to r e c o v e r and rec la im the au tonomy of p r a c t i c a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y and show i ts r e l e v a n c e to all domains of c u l t u r e , we 
r e a l i z e today the t y p e of dia logical communi t i e s t ha t a r e requi red 
for i ts f lour ish ing a r e being d i s t o r t e d , undermined , and 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y b locked from coming into e x i s t e n c e . 
Berns te in asks Habermas : "Under what cond i t ions will a g e n t s who have a c l e a r 
unde r s t and ing of the i r h i s to r i ca l s i tua t ion be mot iva ted to overcome d i s t o r t ed 
communica t ion and s t r i ve t o w a r d an ideal form of communi ty l i f e ? What a r e t h e 
c o n c r e t e dynamics of this p r o c e s s ? Who a r e or will become i ts a g e n t s ? " ^ Nei ther one 
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answers t h e q u e s t i o n . Berns te in caps it off saying Habermas is right when he c o n f r o n t s 
"our h i s to r i ca l s i t u a t i o n " and dec l a r e s it is one in which " 'bo th r evo lu t iona ry 
s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e and t h e o r e t i c a l s e l f - c e r t a i n t y a r e gone.'"*3 (In the world so descr ibed 
the loss of r evo lu t iona ry s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e and t h e o r e t i c a l s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e may be a 
blessing in disguise.) But what is it t h a t sys temat ica l ly blocks the needed dia logical 
communi t i e s f rom coming in to e x i s t e n c e ? Pe rhaps the John Dewey L e c t u r e was not the 
occas ion for Berns te in to s t a r t upon de ta i l ed answers to the ques t ions he asks o t h e r s . 
And pe rhaps Berns te in t h e phi losopher should not be e x p e c t e d to provide a n s w e r s . 
But t h e l e c t u r e ser iously u n d e r c u t s i tself in not reminding us tha t t h e s e ques t ions 
must be asked and answer s sought if phrones is is to be informed judgment abou t 
s i t ua t ions t h a t demand we a c t . In Be rns t e in ' s universe of d i scourse , t h e appeal of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e a t work is inspired by the modera t ion of Ar i s to t l e , Deweyan method , and 
post F r a n k f u r t c r i t i c a l t h e o r y . It is now p r o t e c t e d (seek not to ta l i ty ! ) f rom i ts own 
s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e poss ib i l i t ies or even proc l iv i t i es but it too easi ly e s t ab l i shes a b s t r a c t 
phrones is as t he way . The t e x t admi t s of no o the r p r a c t i c e . The world d e p i c t e d by the 
t e x t admi t s no o ther way . But acco rd ing to Berns t e in , in t e x t s ou ts ide the l e c t u r e , t he 
world has not been s u f f i c i e n t l y quer ied as to i ts n a t u r e by i ts impor tan t philosophic 
i n v e s t i g a t o r s . What t h e unasked ques t ions may tell us about phronesis , p lura l i sm, and 
mutual r e s p e c t for all hones t d i f f e r e n c e s remains to be seen . Some answers and insights 
will come as resu l t s of new social p r a c t i c e , accord ing to Dewey 's p r a c t i c a l judgment . 
But again we must cal l for theory and spec i f i c s r e spec t ing a Deweyan i n d e t e r m i n a t e 
s i tua t ion t h a t demands we a c t . 
B e r n s t e i n ' s ca l l for phrones i s is, I be l i eve , an express ion of hope, a phi losophic 
s t a t e m e n t of means to ove rcome "wild p lura l i sm," i .e. , the pol i t ics of nihil ism, and a 
s t a t e m e n t t h a t things a r e even worse than they a p p e a r . Phrones is is the media t ion of a 
universal and a judgment of a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , but today we a p p a r e n t l y lack t h e 
un ive r sa l s . In f a c t , h o w e v e r , the e th i ca l un iversa l s of c lass ica l philosophy and the 
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universa l s of the g r e a t bourgeo i s r evo lu t ions still ex is t but in t h e p r e s e n t form of the i r 
h i s to r ica l ly c o n c r e t e r e a l i z a t i o n they have s u f f e r e d c lass based pol i t ica l and 
t echno log ica l d e f o r m a t i o n . How to bring in to e x i s t e n c e the i r more ful ly r ea l i zed 
humane c o n t e n t , some form of soc ia l i s t based d e m o c r a c y , is both phi losophic and 
e x t r a - p h i l o s o p h i c p r o j e c t . The pecu l ia r e x i s t e n c e of the g r e a t po l i t i c a l - e th i ca l 
un iversa l s speaks to the pecu l i a r i n t e l l e c t u a l t ens ion t h a t is phi losophy. In t h e domain 
of social t h o u g h t , phi losophy at i ts bes t is f inely honed c r i t i c a l response to social 
problems not pr imar i ly of ph i losophy ' s own making nor problems t h a t philosophy a lone 
can so lve . This is a p r o b l e m a t i c all who pursue phi losophy must con tend wi th . The 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p rob lem t h a t is phi losophy pa radox ica l ly emerges most ful ly fo rmed but also 
bes t c o n c e a l e d in well wrough t phi losophy. It is he re t h a t t h e power of phi losophy ' s 
c o n t e n t and m e t h o d , of phi losophic a r g u m e n t , c o n c e a l s f rom i tself and its fo l lowers the 
p rob lema t i c t h a t is ph i losophy . But it is just h e r e in t h e r i ches of well wrought 
philosophy t h a t we have t h e g r e a t e s t oppor tun i ty to l ea rn to s ee ourse lves t r u l y . This 
is t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t is B e r n s t e i n ' s l e c t u r e . 
B e r n s t e i n ' s l e c t u r e is a d v a n c e and r e t u r n . It is a m u l t i f a c e t e d phi losophical 
a d v a n c e beyond the r e c e n t obsession with " rad ica l r e l a t iv i sm and incommensurab i l i ty . " 
(p. 3) It is a p p r o p r i a t e r e t u r n , given Dewey ' s h i s to ry , t h a t Berns te in now joins with 
o t h e r s in a r e th ink ing of pa r t of our Ar i s to t e l i an h e r i t a g e . Berns te in ' s basic 
p e r s p e c t i v e on social c h a n g e was well exp res sed ea r ly on . Replying to " e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " 
c r i t i c i sms of Dewey ' s unde r s t and ing of what c o n s t i t u t e s our t r u e human problems and 
cond i t ion Berns te in said, " D e w e y ' s e n t i r e philosophy is an a rgumen t t h a t the method of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e is our bes t r e s o u r c e and guide for living . . .Dewey ' s impe ra t i ve c e r t a i n t y 
lacks the g lamour of more e x t r e m i s t phi losophies , but his sane , p i ecemea l app roach to 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of human e x p e r i e n c e is undoubted ly a more r ea l i s t i c and u l t ima te ly more 
e f f e c t i v e guide for mee t ing our problems and making human e x i s t e n c e more l i vab l e . " 7 
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The appea l of B e r n s t e i n ' s Dewey, of Dewey himsel f , to sane methods of social 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n d i r e c t e d by Deweyan in t e l l i gence gives Dewey's p e r s p e c t i v e and method 
the compel l ing s t a t u s of near s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h . By joining the sane to the p i ecemea l , 
the p e a c e f u l is impl ied . And the non-p iecemeal is now implici t ly joined to the n o t - s a n e 
and the n o t - p e a c e f u l . Who will r e j e c t the cal l for social c h a n g e as the sane , p i e c e m e a l , 
and p e a c e f u l reso lu t ion of i n d e t e r m i n a t e s i tua t ions which c a r r y within themse lves new, 
r a t iona l , o b j e c t i v e , communal ly a c c e p t a b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ? There is the problem t h a t 
the appea l of method can ideologica l ly es tabl i sh the n a t u r e of r ea l i t y , when in f a c t 
r ea l i ty should d e t e r m i n e the va l id i ty of t he me thod . Concea led in the magic of Dewey 's 
d i a l ec t i c a r e 1) t he u n d e m o n s t r a t e d assumption tha t Deweyan phronesis , Theory of 
Valuat ion as ou t l ine of a program of social t heo ry and ac t i on , is a d e q u a t e to soc ie ty as 
it is, and 2) Dewey 's a - t h e o r e t i c a l d i s sec t ion of our body po l i t i c . We a re l e f t with no 
vocabula ry to provide c r i t i c a l e n t r a n c e and l e v e r a g e a d e q u a t e to soc ie ty t o d a y . This is 
why Berns te in will not have us r ead Dewey 's t e x t s for " t r u t h " but r a the r ca l l s for a 
subla t ion of his vision and sp i r i t . But this has proved a knot ty t a sk , in par t producing 
the real poss ibi l i ty of a s q u a r e c i r c l e in Be rns t e in ' s un ive r se . 
J . H. Randa l l , J r . , r emarks t h a t when Ar i s to t l e discusses phrones is he is "c lea r ly 
g 
thinking h e r e in t e rms of medical d iagnos is , . . . " Ar i s to t e l i an medic ine , like e d u c a t i o n , 
succeeds th rough c o o p e r a t i o n with i t s o b j e c t . But our o b j e c t , the body po l i t i c , is such 
tha t it can c o o p e r a t e with i tself a t bes t in varying degrees of ill h e a l t h . Be rns t e in ' s 
l e c t u r e speaks to new, o r , r ea l ly , o ld - fash ioned highly des i rab le final c a u s e s for our 
c o m m u n i t y - t o - b e . This is a n e c e s s a r y condi t ion of our improved h e a l t h . But f inal c a u s e s 
have a t e n d e n c y to t a k e on the cover of ideo logy . The well being of phrones is , of our 
very se lves , now requ i r e s c r i t i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of e f f i c i e n t , ma te r i a l , and formal 
causes t h a t brought us to our p r e sen t p r eca r ious cond i t ion and sus ta in us in i t . This, as 
Berns te in knows, is t he way to in formed phrones i s . This is the s tuf f of ano the r John 
Dewey Lec tu re—some good Berns te in ques t ions put to "The Var ie t i es of P lura l i sm." 
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